

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINARECEIVED  
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Stephon L. Walton, #2006-01720, ) C/A No. 9:06-1242-GRA-GCK  
vs. Plaintiff, )  
                        ) Report and Recommendation  
Joey Preston, Co. Adm.; )  
David Crenshaw, Sheriff; )  
Dr. Hellams, Doctor; and )  
Nurse Hampton, Nurse, )  
                        )  
Defendants. )

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The plaintiff, Stephon L. Walton, is a prisoner proceeding *pro se*. He seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in prisoner cases filed under § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

**PRO SE COMPLAINT**

As noted above, the plaintiff is a *pro se* litigant. This Court is required to liberally construe *pro se* documents, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 9 (1980) (*per curiam*). Even under this less stringent standard, however, a *pro se* complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to *pro se* pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128,

1133 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999), or construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 174, 1278 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).

### **SECTION 1915 SCREENING**

The complaint *sub judice* has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without paying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" or is "frivolous or malicious." § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).

### **FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM**

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a plaintiff is required to provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The plaintiff has neglected to set forth any factual allegations regarding any claims against any of the listed defendants. The statement of claim section of the complaint is blank. In the relief section, the plaintiff states he is only seeking proper medical attention. The extent of his complaint is that he is "constantly swelling and something needs to be done before [he] seriously gets hurt or maybe worse." Even construing a complaint liberally, a plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to support his claim. Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). See also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit as frivolous where allegation was conclusory and

nonsensical on its face); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989) (where plaintiff's complaint "failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion"). Although required to liberally construe a *pro se* complaint, this Court is not required to develop tangential claims from scant assertions in the complaint. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).

With respect to medical care, a prisoner in a § 1983 case "must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff has not alleged any of the named defendants acted indifferently towards him. In fact the complaint contains no factual allegations against any of the individual defendants. Here, Plaintiff's conclusory statements are not sufficient factual allegations to support a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Plaintiff's complaint under § 1983 should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

#### RECOMMENDATION


Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint in the above-captioned case ***without prejudice*** and without issuance and service of process. See Denton v. Hernandez, *supra*; Neitzke v. Williams, *supra*; Haines v. Kerner, *supra*; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-204 & n. \* (4th Cir. 1993); Boyce v. Alizaduh, *supra*; Todd v. Baskerville, *supra*, 712 F.2d at 74; 28 U.S.C. § 1915A [as soon as possible after

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<sup>1</sup>Plaintiff's claims in the above-captioned case are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, because Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee. See Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1990). In Belcher, the Court noted "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of convicted prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the detainee." 898 F.2d at 34.

docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal]. **The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.**

Respectfully Submitted,



George C. Kosko  
United States Magistrate Judge

April 28, 2006  
Charleston, South Carolina

**Notice of Right to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's "Report and Recommendation"**  
**&**  
**The Serious Consequences of a Failure to Do So**

The plaintiff is hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation (or Order and Recommendation) must be filed within **ten (10) days** of the date of its filing. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Based thereon, this Report and Recommendation, any objections thereto, and the case file will be **delivered to a United States District Judge** fourteen (14) days after this Report and Recommendation is filed. Advance Coating Technology, Inc. v. LEP Chemical, Ltd., 142 F.R.D. 91, 94 & n. 3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 6243 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-271 (1976); and Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 3411 (D.S.C. 1993).

During the ten-day period, **but not thereafter**, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he or she wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections. **Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections.** Failure to file written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Schronce v. United States, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-847 & nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he or she did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS® 8487 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Praylow v. Martin, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.) (party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Howard, supra, the Court stated that general, non-specific objections are *not* sufficient:

**A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. \*\*\* This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. \*\* \* We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the source of the error.**

Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-1019 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who proceeded *pro se* in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district court:

**Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I object' preserves no issue for review. \*\*\* A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.**

See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS® 15,084 (8th Cir. 1989) ("no *de novo* review if objections are untimely or general"), which involved a *pro se* litigant; and Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3rd Cir. 1984) ("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger *de novo* review"). This notice, hereby, apprises the plaintiff of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written objections. See Wright v. Collins, supra; and Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS® 19,302 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections addressed as follows:

**Larry W. Propes, Clerk  
United States District Court  
Post Office Box 835  
Charleston, South Carolina 29402**